How to prepare your organisation for the post-quantum era
Quantum computing promises to revolutionise problem-solving across industries. But as this technology advances, it also poses a serious threat to classical cryptographic systems. Encryption methods such as RSA, Diffie-Hellman and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) have protected businesses for decades, but they are becoming vulnerable to future quantum attacks.
The risk is not limited to a distant future. In a “harvest now, decrypt later” (HNDL) attack, encrypted network traffic can be harvested today and stored until quantum computing capability makes decryption possible. For organisations responsible for sensitive or long-lived data, it is time to act now to reduce exposure and build a more resilient security posture.
The migration window is also shorter than it looks. The Australian Signals Directorate expects transition planning to be complete by the end of 2026, migration of critical systems to be underway by 2028 and quantum-vulnerable cryptography to be retired by 2030. Comparable deadlines apply in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Japan and across the European Union. Yet 95% of organisations still have no defined quantum strategy (ISACA Quantum Computing Pulse Poll).
With post-quantum cryptography standards now finalised and national migration deadlines set, future-proofing encryption is no longer just a technical consideration; it is a strategic business decision. The following five steps provide a practical framework to help you prepare: what to look at, what to decide, and in what order.
Step 1: Conduct an encryption audit
The first step in preparing for quantum security is understanding where and how cryptography is used across the organisation. Identify the algorithms, keys, certificates, protocols and devices currently protecting your data, including any systems that rely on classical algorithms such as RSA, Diffie-Hellman or ECC. The Australian Signals Directorate’s LATICE framework provides a practical structure for this work.
This visibility is essential for prioritising what needs attention first. Consider whether encryption is being used for data storage, network communications, financial transactions, backup environments, AI and GPU infrastructure or other business-critical systems. Automated tools can help make the audit more efficient by scanning environments and identifying areas of potential weakness.
A thorough audit also supports crypto-agility: the ability to adapt cryptographic systems as threats, standards and organisational requirements change. Senetas CN and CV Series encryptors are designed with this flexibility in mind, supporting in-field algorithm updates across the installed base and integration with external sources of keys and entropy without requiring hardware replacement.
Step 2: Perform a risk assessment
Not every system, application or dataset carries the same level of quantum risk. A risk assessment helps identify which assets are most exposed and which should be addressed first.
Focus on systems that handle sensitive or long-lasting data, as they are likely to be most exposed to quantum threats and HNDL attacks. Government organisations, critical infrastructure operators, financial institutions and healthcare providers should pay particular attention to data that must remain confidential for many years.
In practice, the highest-value data-in-motion paths are usually data centre interconnects, cloud and multi-cloud connectivity, AI and GPU infrastructure, backup and disaster recovery links, operational and critical-infrastructure links, and selected partner connections. Links where you control both endpoints are the most practical place to start.
At this stage, look closely at systems using RSA, ECC or Diffie-Hellman encryption methods, as these classical algorithms are among the first areas that will need review. Use the assessment to rank remediation according to data sensitivity, required protection lifetime and operational impact.
Step 3: Decide how to mitigate the risk
Once you know where your exposure sits, decide how to treat it. There are three practical options, and most organisations will use all three across different parts of the network.
- Upgrade in place. Where equipment is crypto-agile, post-quantum protection can be introduced through an in-field update rather than a hardware refresh. Hybrid mode runs conventional and post-quantum key establishment together, so interoperability is preserved while HNDL exposure is reduced. This is the lowest-disruption path and the one most organisations should start with.
- Replace. Where systems cannot be updated, plan replacement with equipment that supports the NIST post-quantum standards, and make PQC support a procurement requirement for anything intended to remain in service beyond 2030.
- Accept the risk. Some systems will not warrant action yet. Limit this to data with low sensitivity and short retention. It is not an appropriate answer for anything that must stay confidential into the 2030s.
Transport Independent Mode (TIM) offers a further way to reduce HNDL exposure on links you control. TIM secures traffic at Layers 2, 3 and 4 across any transport using a key-provider model rather than public-key exchange on the wire. TIM is not post-quantum cryptography; it is a different approach to the same exposure, and the two can be used together.
Whichever route you take, performance matters. Senetas encryptors add micro latency, so protection can be introduced without changing how the network behaves.
Step 4: Evaluate quantum-safe solutions
When you assess an encryption solution, test it against the things that will still matter in five years. Use this checklist:
- Implements the NIST post-quantum standards, and does so in shipping product rather than on a roadmap.
- Independently certified — Common Criteria, FIPS 140-3, US DoDIN APL and NATO.
- Crypto-agile, so algorithms and security policies can be updated in the field without replacing hardware.
- Supports hybrid operation during the transition, with a path to retire classical dependencies.
- Adds only micro latency, and protects at Layers 2, 3 and 4 across any transport.
- Keys, policies and encryption infrastructure remain under your control.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and Quantum Random Number Generation (QRNG) are worth considering where the use case warrants it. QKD distributes keys using quantum properties so that interception can be detected; QRNG provides high-entropy randomness for key generation. Both are complementary to post-quantum cryptography rather than a substitute for it — PQC is the mainstream path, a position national authorities including Singapore have stated explicitly. Senetas encryptors are compatible with both, so external quantum key and entropy sources can be incorporated where they are justified.
Step 5: Build a phased migration timeline
NIST released its first three finalised post-quantum cryptography standards in August 2024: FIPS 203 for a module-lattice-based key encapsulation mechanism, FIPS 204 for module-lattice-based digital signatures, and FIPS 205 for stateless hash-based digital signatures.
Senetas has deployed all four of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithm finalists in certified hardware, alongside a comprehensive suite of standard classical NIST-approved algorithms. Approved for use in FIPS mode: ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024 (FIPS 203) for key establishment, and ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65 and ML-DSA-87 (FIPS 204) for certificate signing and authentication.
Plan the introduction of these algorithms across priority systems in three phases. Assess and mitigate over the next 90 days, using the audit and risk assessment from Steps 1 and 2. Pilot and architect over the next 12 months, deploying PQC in hybrid mode in controlled environments to test interoperability and establish performance baselines. Roll out in phases from there, starting with critical and hard-to-update infrastructure, with a target completion of 2030.
Include technical testing, interoperability, governance, ownership and review points so the roadmap can adapt as standards and threats evolve. The milestones below set the pace in most jurisdictions.
Migration milestones around the world
Governments and standards bodies have moved from strategy to deadlines. These milestones are planning drivers for your own timeline; they are not claims of product compliance.
| Jurisdiction | Milestones | What it means |
| Australia — ASD | 2026 / 2028 / 2030 | Transition planning by end 2026; migration of critical systems underway by 2028; completion by 2030. New cryptographic equipment intended for use beyond 2030 should support approved PQC. |
| United States — NIST | 2030 / 2035 | The finalised PQC standards are ready for implementation now. NIST IR 8547 sets out deprecation of quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms by 2030 and disallowance by 2035. |
| United Kingdom — NCSC | 2028 / 2031 / 2035 | Initial migration plan by 2028; highest-priority migrations by 2031; completion by 2035. |
| Canada — Canadian Centre for Cyber Security | 2026 / 2031 / 2035 | Federal departmental migration plans from April 2026; high-priority systems by 2031; remaining systems by 2035. |
| European Union — coordinated roadmap | Phased | Member States to produce national transition plans and migrate in phases, prioritising high-risk use cases and critical infrastructure. |
| Japan | 2035 | Government and related agencies aim to transition to PQC by 2035, with a national roadmap being developed in FY2026 and earlier action for especially sensitive or long-lived information. |
| Singapore | PQC first | PQC identified as the mainstream approach to quantum-safe migration using NIST standards as the baseline, with QKD complementary for selected high-assurance use cases. |
| G7 financial sector | ~2035 | The 2026 G7 Cyber Expert Group identifies 2035 as a prudent planning horizon for financial-sector transition, with risk-based prioritisation and crypto-agility. |
Sources: Australian Signals Directorate; NIST IR 8547; UK NCSC; Canadian Centre for Cyber Security; EU Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography; Government of Japan; Cyber Security Agency of Singapore; G7 Cyber Expert Group (2026).
Whichever jurisdiction you operate in, the pattern is the same: plan now, migrate the most sensitive systems first, and finish before 2030 to 2035. Data that must stay confidential beyond those dates is already exposed.
Prepare now for the post-quantum transition
The exact timing of large-scale quantum computing is still uncertain. The risk to long-lived data is not — HNDL exposure is building today, and the preparation required across networks, applications and cryptographic infrastructure is significant. Organisations can begin now by improving cryptographic visibility, assessing exposure and introducing adaptable protections where the risk is greatest.
Senetas has protected the world’s most sensitive data in motion for 25 years. Our encryptors are certified to Common Criteria, FIPS 140-3, US DoDIN APL and NATO, and were first to market with post-quantum encryption in high-speed hardware in 2024. They are crypto-agile, run hybrid mode today, protect at Layers 2, 3 and 4 across any transport, add micro latency, and accept external quantum key and entropy sources — so post-quantum protection can be introduced alongside your existing infrastructure rather than instead of it.
Speak to a Senetas consultant about your post-quantum security roadmap.
